

# LearnSafe

## from an “academic” point of view



## Objectives

The main objective of the LearnSafe project is to create **methods** and **tools** for supporting **processes of organisational learning** at the nuclear power plants (NPP).

their decisions,  
approaches and  
attitudes

The focus of the project is **senior managers** at NPPs and power utilities who are responsible for **strategic choice** and **resource allocation**.

The LearnSafe project will develop **methods** and **tools**, which can be used in the **management of change**, and in ensuring an **efficient organisational learning**.

My interpretation:

- (1) To develop **methods** and **tools** to support senior managers in **management of change**.
- (2) To develop **methods** and **tools** to efficient **organisational learning** (but by whom?).




## Perceived challenges

What are the perceived, emerging challenges (in the management of NPP)?

- Economic pressure (**maintain competitiveness**)
- Human resource management (**maintaining competency of NPP staff**)
- Nuclear know-how (**maintain competency among vendors**)
- Rules and regulations (**maintain open communication with regulator**)
- Focus and priorities (**maintaining own capability to meet goals**)
- Ageing, modernisation and new technologies (**maintain plant technical condition**)
- Public confidence and trust (**maintain social acceptability of nuclear power**)
- Organisational climate and culture (**maintain motivation and safety culture**)

How do senior managers cope with the emerging challenges?

- Money
- People
- Technology
- Practices
- Environment (social)



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## Important balances

- |                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
|                                  | Safety ↔ Efficiency                      |
|                                  | Tradition ↔ Renewal                      |
|                                  | Formal ↔ Informal                        |
| <b>Management:</b>               | Self-confidence ↔ Willingness to listen  |
|                                  | Centralized ↔ Distributed                |
| <b>Decision making:</b>          | Discipline ↔ Flexibility and innovation. |
| <b>Procedures and practices:</b> | Maintain overview ↔ Not loose details.   |
|                                  | Short term ↔ Long term.                  |
| <b>Priorities:</b>               |  |



One of the hypotheses in the project is that an efficient identification and management of these balances is one of the root causes of good performance in nuclear power plants.




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## Model(s) of system

Money  
People  
Technology  
Practices  
Environment (legal, social)

Political-economic environment  
Workforce  
Technology  
Organisation of NPP/utility

Technology  
Individuals  
Group  
Organisation  
    administrative view  
    political view  
    cultural view  
Environment



ORFA project



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## Safety performance indicators

*Safety can be characterised by an absence of risks, which means that threats are known and have been acted upon in a proper way.*

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| List of event "forerunners" with potential impact on plant hardware & performance. | Annual rate of safety-significant errors (i.e., reportable violations of technical specifications) by plant personnel, contractors, and others.   |
|  | Annual rate of maintenance problems (defined as maintenance rework or overdue maintenance).   |
|  | Ratio of corrective versus preventative maintenance work requests (MWRs) on safety equipment.   |
|  | Annual rate of problems (deviations/failures) with repeated root cause (i.e., a cause previously identified by a vendor, the plant, another plant, the regulator, etc., for a similar plant or group of plants, or for similar components). |
|  | Annual rate of plant changes that are not incorporated into design-basis documents by the time of the next outage following the change.   |

*Safety is a dynamic non-event (Karl Weick)*

Questions:

Which are the safety performance indicators identified by the project?  
How can they be used to support (efficient) organisational learning?



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# Organisational learning

The generic schema of organizational learning includes some **informational content**, a **learning product**, a **learning process** which consists in **acquiring, processing, and storing** information and a **learner** to whom the learning process is attributed.

Organizations as information-processing brains (Simon)  
 Organizational knowledge base (Pautzke)  
 Single-loop, double-loop learning (Argyris)

A big problem thereby lies in the **measurement** of organizational learning, in making it operational and completing the transformation of organizational knowledge base.

- Structural aspects ~ Overlapping steps of implementing structural features
- Dynamic aspects ~ Requisite psychological characteristics of the organisation and its staff promoting organisational learning
- Procedural aspects ~ (?)

Barriers to organisational learning:  
 36 barriers found in the literature.


**Questions:**  
 How can knowledge about barriers be turned around to support (effective) learning?  
 How do the barriers relate to the system model (levels)?



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# Conclusions?

n-level system  
 Balances  
**Barriers?**  
**Safety indicators?**




Interview guidelines  
 Metaplan sessions  
**Analysis?**  
**Organisational learning?**

Is (efficient) **management of change** the same as (efficient) **organisational learning**?

How can the **balances** be (efficiently) managed? (and modelled?)

How do they relate to **safety**?

How can (organisational) **learning** be supported?



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# Components of safety?

## Requisite variety

The controlling systems must have (at least) as much variety as the target system.



Solution 1: increase the variety of the controlling system ("prepare for the unexpected")

Solution 2: reduce the variety of the target system

Is safety one or the other - or both?

Unsafe organisation ⇒ (Many) Accidents

NOT [Unsafe organisation] ⇒ NOT [(Many) Accidents]

Safe organisation ⇒ Few accidents

Since the last statement does not follow logically from the first, then how should safety be defined?



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
# Other issues

## THE USE OF TIME:

Shortage of time is important - both at the sharp end and the blunt end  
To compensate for lack of time, people make a trade off between thoroughness and efficiency.

**Question:** If time is so important, why is it not part of the models?

Influence diagram:




**Question:** Why is it linear rather than non-linear?



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# What is learning?

The effect of learning means that a system (individual, organisation) acts (responds) differently to the same condition. The difference can be either positive or negative.



$\Delta T = T2 - T1$       How **large** must  $\Delta T$  be before learning takes place? How **fast** do we expect the effects of learning?

$\Delta R = R' - R$       How **large** must  $\Delta R$  be to show learning? What are the **indicators** of learning?

How **small** can  $\Delta K$  be for two conditions to be "the same"?




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# Models of learning?



What learning IS?  
(structural view)

What learning DOES?  
(functional view)



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